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CS526: Information security

User Authentication

Readings for This Lecture

- Wikipedia
 - [Password](#)
 - [Password strength](#)
 - [Salt_\(cryptography\)](#)
 - [Password cracking](#)
 - [Trusted path](#)
 - [One time password](#)





1: User authentication

Three A's of Information Security

- ▶ Security is about differentiating among authorized accesses and unauthorized accesses
 - ▶ Required by all services
- ▶ Authentication
 - ▶ Check who is accessing
- ▶ Access control
 - ▶ Ensure only authorized access are allowed
- ▶ Auditing
 - ▶ Record what is happening, to identify attacks later and recover

Authentication & Access Control according to Wikipedia

- ▶ **Authentication** is the act of establishing or confirming something (or someone) as *authentic*, that is, that **claims made by or about the subject are true**. This might involve **confirming the identity of a person**, tracing the origins of an artifact, ensuring that a product is what its packaging and labeling claims to be, or **assuring that a computer program is a trusted one**.
- ▶ **Access control** is a system which enables an authority to control access to areas and resources in a given physical facility or computer-based information system.

User Authentication


- ▶ Using a method to validate users who attempt to access a computer system or resources, to ensure they are authorized
- ▶ Types of user authentication
 - ▶ **Something you know**
 - ▶ E.g., user account names and passwords
 - ▶ **Something you have**
 - ▶ Smart cards or other security tokens
 - ▶ **Something you are**
 - ▶ Biometrics

Scenarios Requiring User Authentication

- ▶ **Scenarios**

- ▶ Logging into a local computer
- ▶ Logging into a computer remotely
- ▶ Logging into a network
- ▶ Access web sites

- ▶ Vulnerabilities can exist at client side, server side, or communication channel



User authentication

Variants of Passwords

- ▶ Password
- ▶ Passphrase
 - ▶ a sequence of words or other text used for similar purpose as password
- ▶ Passcode
- ▶ Personal identification number (PIN)

Threats to Passwords

- ▶ Eavesdropping (insecure channel between client and server)
- ▶ Login spoofing (human errors), shoulder surfing, keyloggers
- ▶ Offline dictionary attacks
- ▶ Social engineering (human errors)
 - ▶ e.g., pretexting: creating and using an invented scenario (the pretext) to persuade a target to release information or perform an action and is usually done over the telephone
- ▶ Online guessing (weak passwords)

Guessing Attacks: Two Factors for Password Strength

- ▶ The average number of guesses the attacker must make to find the correct password
 - ▶ determined by how unpredictable the password is, including how long the password is, what set of symbols it is drawn from, and how it is created
- ▶ The ease with which an attacker can check the validity of a guessed password
 - ▶ determined by how the password is stored, how the checking is done, and any limitation on trying passwords

Password Entropy

- ▶ The entropy bits of a password, i.e., the information entropy of a password, measured in bits, is
 - ▶ The base-2 logarithm of the number of guesses needed to find the password with certainty
 - ▶ A password with, say, 42 bits of strength calculated in this way would be as strong as a string of 42 bits chosen randomly.
 - ▶ Adding one bit of entropy to a password doubles the number of guesses required.
 - ▶ On average, an attacker will have to try half the possible passwords before finding the correct one
- ▶ Aka. Guess entropy

Estimating Password Entropy

- ▶ People are notoriously remiss at achieving sufficient entropy to produce satisfactory passwords.
- ▶ NIST **suggests** the following scheme to **estimate** the entropy of human-generated passwords:
 - ▶ the entropy of the first character is four bits;
 - ▶ the entropy of the next seven characters are two bits per character;
 - ▶ the ninth through the twentieth character has 1.5 bits of entropy per character;
 - ▶ characters 21 and above have one bit of entropy per character.
- ▶ This would imply that an eight-character human-selected password has about 18 bits of entropy.

Towards Better Measurement of Password Entropy

- ▶ NIST suggestion fails to consider usage of different category of characters:
 - ▶ Lower-case letters, digits, upper-case letters, special symbols
- ▶ Orders also matter:
 - ▶ “Password123!” should have different entropy from “ao3swPd!2s1r”
- ▶ State of art is to use Markov chains to model probability of different strings as passwords
 - ▶ May rank something “yqzjx” as very secure
- ▶ Fundamental challenge: there are different attack strategies out there, which try passwords with different ordering

Example of Weak Passwords (from Wikipedia)

- ▶ Default passwords (as supplied by the system vendor and meant to be changed at installation time): *password*, *default*, *admin*, *guest*, etc.
- ▶ Dictionary words: *chameleon*, *RedSox*, *sandbags*, *bunnyhop!*, *IntenseCrabtree*, etc.
- ▶ Words with numbers appended: *password1*, *deer2000*, *john1234*, etc.,
- ▶ Words with simple obfuscation: *p@ssw0rd*, *l33th4x0r*, *g0ldf1sh*, etc.
- ▶ Doubled words: *crabcrab*, *stopstop*, *treetree*, *passpass*, etc., can be easily tested automatically.

Example of Weak Passwords (from Wikipedia)

- ▶ Common sequences from a keyboard row: *qwerty*, *12345*, *asdfgh*, *fred*, etc.
- ▶ Numeric sequences based on well known numbers such as 911, 314159, or 27182, etc.,
- ▶ Identifiers: *jsmith123*, *1/1/1970*, *555–1234*, "your username", etc.,
- ▶ Anything personally related to an individual: license plate number, Social Security number, current or past telephone number, student ID, address, birthday, sports team, relative's or pet's names/nicknames/birthdays, etc.,
 - ▶ can easily be tested automatically after a simple investigation of person's details.

Mechanisms to Avoid Weak Passwords

- ▶ Allow long passphrases
- ▶ Randomly generate passwords where appropriate
 - ▶ Though probably inappropriate for most scenarios
- ▶ Check the quality of user-selected passwords
 - ▶ use a number of rules of thumb
 - ▶ run dictionary attack tools
- ▶ Give user suggestions/guidelines in choosing passwords
 - ▶ e.g., think of a sentence and select letters from it, “It’s 12 noon and I am hungry” => “I’S12&IAH”
 - ▶ Using both letter, numbers, and special characters

Balancing Password Entropy & Usability Concerns

- ▶ Forcing randomly generated passwords is often bad
 - ▶ A user needs to remember passwords for tens, if not hundreds of accounts
 - ▶ High entropy passwords are difficult to remember
- ▶ Often times, guessing passwords is not the weakest link
 - ▶ One can use various ways to reduce adversary's abilities to test password guesses
 - ▶ When a user cannot remember the password for an account, there must be a way to allow a user to retrieve it
 - ▶ The recovering method either has low security, or costs lots of money
 - ▶ It creates a weaker link
- ▶ Usability matters

Storing Passwords (UNIX Case Study)

▶ Old UNIX

- ▶ The file `/etc/passwd` stores $H(\text{password})$ together with each user's login name, user id, home directory, login shell, etc.
 - ▶ H is essentially a one-way hash function
- ▶ The file `/etc/passwd` must be world readable
- ▶ Brute force attacks possible even if H is one-way
 - ▶ how to most effectively brute-force when trying to obtain password of any account on a system with many accounts?

Password Salts

- ▶ **More modern UNIX**
 - ▶ Divide /etc/passwd into two files: /etc/passwd; and /etc/shadow (readable only by root)
- ▶ **Store $[r, H(\text{password}, r)]$ rather than $H(\text{password})$ in /etc/shadow**
 - ▶ r is randomly chosen for each password
 - ▶ r is public, similar to Initial Vector in CBC & CTR modes
- ▶ **Benefits**
 - ▶ dictionary attacks much more difficult
 - ▶ cost of attacking a single account remains the same
 - ▶ if two users happen to choose the same password, it doesn't immediately show

Mechanisms to Defend Against Dictionary and Guessing Attacks

- ▶ Protect stored passwords (use both cryptography & access control)
- ▶ Disable accounts with multiple failed attempts
- ▶ Require extra authentication mechanism (e.g., phone, other email account, etc.)

Mechanisms to Defend Against Login Spoofing: Trusted Path

- ▶ Login Spoofing Attacks:

- ▶ write a program showing a login window on screen and record the passwords
- ▶ put su in current directory

- ▶ Defense: Trusted Path

- ▶ Mechanism that provides confidence that the user is communicating with the real intended server
 - ▶ attackers can't intercept or modify whatever information is being communicated.
 - ▶ defends attacks such as fake login programs
- ▶ Example: Ctrl+Alt+Del for log in on Windows
 - ▶ Causes a non-maskable interrupt that can only be intercepted by the operating system, guaranteeing that the login window cannot be spoofed

Spoofing & Defenses on the Web

▶ Phishing attacks

- ▶ attempting to acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in electronic communication

▶ Website forgery

- ▶ Set up fake websites that look like e-commerce sites and trick users into visiting the sites and entering sensitive info

▶ Defense methods

- ▶ Browser filtering of known phishing sites
- ▶ Cryptographic authentication of servers (will talk about in future)
- ▶ User-configured authentication of servers
 - ▶ To ensure that the site is the one the human user has in mind
 - ▶ E.g., site key, pre-selected picture/phrases

KeyLogging

- ▶ Threats from insecure client side
- ▶ Keystroke logging (keylogging) is the action of tracking (or logging) the keys struck on a keyboard, typically in a covert manner so that the person using the keyboard is unaware that their actions are being monitored
- ▶ Software -based
 - ▶ key-stroke events, grab web forms, analyze HTTP packets
- ▶ Hardware-based
 - ▶ Connector, wireless sniffers, acoustic based
- ▶ Defenses:
 - ▶ Anti-spyware, network monitors, on-screen soft keyboard, automatic form filler, etc.
- ▶ In general difficult to deal with once on the system



Using Passwords Over Insecure Channels

- ▶ **One-time passwords**
 - ▶ Each password is used only once
 - ▶ Defend against passive adversaries who eavesdrop and later attempt to impersonate
- ▶ **Challenge response**
 - ▶ Send a response related to both the password and a challenge
- ▶ **Zero knowledge proof of knowledge**
 - ▶ Prove knowledge of a secret value, without leaking any info about the secret

One-Time Password

- ▶ Shared lists of one-time passwords
- ▶ Time-synchronized OTP
 - ▶ E.g., use $\text{MAC}_K(t)$, where K is shared secret, and t is current time
- ▶ Using a hash chain (Lamport)
 - ▶ $h(s), h(h(s), h(h(h(s)))), \dots, h^{1000}(s)$
 - ▶ use these values as passwords in reverse order



Lamport's One-Time Password: Using a Hash Chain

- ▶ One-time setup:
 - ▶ A selects a value w , a hash function $H()$, and an integer t , computes $w_0 = H^t(w)$ and sends w_0 to B
 - ▶ B stores w_0
- ▶ Protocol: to identify to B for the i^{th} time, $1 \leq i \leq t$
 - ▶ A sends to B: $A, i, w_i = H^{t-i}(w)$
 - ▶ B checks $i = i_A$, $H(w_i) = w_{i-1}$
 - ▶ if both holds, $i_A = i_A + 1$

Challenge-Response Protocols

- ▶ Goal: one entity authenticates to other entity proving the knowledge of a secret, 'challenge'
- ▶ Approach: Use time-variant parameters to prevent replay, interleaving attacks, provide uniqueness and timeliness
 - ▶ e.g., nonce (used only once), timestamps

Challenge-response based on symmetric-key crypto

- ▶ Unilateral authentication, timestamp-based
 - ▶ A to B: $\text{MAC}_K(t_A, B)$
- ▶ Unilateral authentication, nonce-based
 - ▶ B to A: r_B
 - ▶ A to B: $\text{MAC}_K(r_B, B)$
- ▶ Mutual authentication, nonce-based
 - ▶ B to A: r_B
 - ▶ A to B: $r_A, \text{MAC}_K(r_A, r_B, B)$
 - ▶ B to A: $\text{MAC}_K(r_B, r_A)$

Other Defenses

- ▶ Alternatives to passwords
 - ▶ graphical passwords
- ▶ Go beyond passwords
 - ▶ security tokens
 - ▶ biometrics
 - ▶ 2-factor authentication
 - ▶ Uses two independent authentication methods
 - ▶ US Banks are required to use 2-factor authentication for online banking
 - ▶ Out of band authentication: uses a channel other than the internet
 - ▶ E.g., phone

What Are Biometrics ?

(ancient Greek: *bios* = "life", *metron* = "measure")

- ▶ **Biometrics are automated methods of recognizing a person based on a physical or behavioral characteristic.**
- ▶ Physical Features
 - ▶ Fingerprint or fingerscan
 - ▶ Hand geometry
 - ▶ Face recognition
 - ▶ Retinal scans
 - ▶ Iris scans
- ▶ Behavioral Characteristics
 - ▶ Handwritten signature
 - ▶ Voice recognition
 - ▶ Typing
 - ▶ Gait



Biometric System

- ▶ **Registration:**

- ▶ A person registers with the system when one or more of his physical and behavioral characteristics are obtained.
- ▶ Information registered in a database (digital template), based on some algorithm.

- ▶ **Use of biometrics:**

- ▶ Biometric of the user is captured and processed into a digital template
- ▶ **Verification:** Compare a sample against a single stored template
- ▶ **Identification:** Search a sample against a database of templates.



2: Human Computable Passwords

J. Blocki, M. Blum, A.Datta, S. Vempala


Slides by J. Blocki

Human Computable Passwords

- ▶ Jeremiah Blocki, Manuel Blum, Anupam Datta, Santosh Vempala
- ▶ Slides by J. Blocki




How Do People Pick Passwords?




Source: [Science of Password Selection](#) (Hunt, 2011)

Password Management



Competing Goals

- ▶ Usability – “easy” for user to create and remember his passwords
- ▶ Security – “hard” for adversary to learn passwords.
 - ▶ After many guesses
 - ▶ Even after seeing other passwords





Our Scheme: Human Computable Passwords

- ▶ Passwords computed by responding to public challenges
 - ▶ Computation done in user's head
- ▶ Remains secure many breaches (e.g., 100)
- ▶ Simple Operations
 - ▶ Addition modulo 10
 - ▶ Memorize a random mapping







Human Computation

- ▶ Restricted
 - ▶ Simple operations (addition, lookup)
 - ▶ Operations performed in memory (limited space)



Random Mapping

Image I			...	
 (I)	9	3	...	6

Initialization:

User Memorizes Random Mapping

$$\text{Logo} : \{I_1, \dots, I_n\} \rightarrow \{0, 1, \dots, 9\}$$

Example: n=30 images



Mnemonics

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{W} \\ \text{M} \end{array} \right) = 4$$

Instruction: Remember that the eagle has a gold beak.
There are four letters in “gold” and “beak”.



Mnemonics




Instruction: Trace the eagles body from the bottom of the eagle's beak down to the bottom of the picture. It looks like the number 7.



σ		...		...
...
4	The words “gold” and “beak” have four letters.	...	The words “lion” and “sand” have four letters.	...
5	The word “eagle” has five letters.	...	The words “zebra” and “grass” have five letters.	...
6		...	You can see six legs total in this picture.	...
...

Single-Digit Challenge



Computing the Response:

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{W} \\ \text{PRIORITY USE} \end{array} \right) \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Lightning} \\ \text{Dog} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{W} \\ \text{PRIORITY USE} \end{array} \right) \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Man} \\ \text{Globe} \end{array} \right) \text{ mod } 10$$

10



$$= 9+3 \text{ mod } 10 = 2$$

0



5



1



6



2



7



3



8




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9



Single-Digit Challenge



Response:

$$10 \left(\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{PRIVACY} \\ \text{W} \\ \text{PRIVACY} \end{array} \right) \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{PRIVACY} \\ \text{W} \\ \text{PRIVACY} \end{array} \right) \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{PRIVACY} \\ \text{W} \\ \text{PRIVACY} \end{array} \right)$$

mod

$$= 9+3 \bmod 10 = 2$$

0



5



1



6



2



7



3




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Single-Digit Challenge



Final Response:

$$\left(\begin{matrix} \text{W} \\ \text{M} \end{matrix} \right) + \left(\begin{matrix} \text{M} \\ \text{W} \end{matrix} \right) = 7 + 4 + 5 \bmod 10 =$$

6



0



5



1



6




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9



Passwords



Username jblocki

Password

0



5



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
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
Passwords



Username jblocki

Password *

0



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
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
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3



8




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Passwords




Username jblocki

Password **

0




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
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
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Usability

My Authentication Time:












- ▶ 7.5 seconds/digit
- ▶ 30 seconds for a 4-digit password
- ▶ 1.25 minutes for a 10-digit password

Memorizing the Secret Mapping:

- ▶ Memorized 100 image/digit pairs in 2.5 hours
- ▶ One Time Cost



Usability (Memorization)

	Human Computable Passwords			Shared Cues	
	N = 100	N = 50	N=30	SC-I	SC-0
Active	0.40	 0	 0	3.93	 0
Typical	2.14	 0.04	 0	10.89	 0
Occasional	2.50	 0.05	 0	22.07	 0
Infrequent	70.7	 22.3	 6.1	119.77	2.44
E[X ₃₆₅]: Extra Rehearsals to maintain <i>all</i> passwords over the first year.					



Open Problems

- ▶ Better measure of password quality
- ▶ Better ways to make people choose more secure passwords
- ▶ Alternatives to passwords?
 - ▶ The secret should be easy to remember, difficult to guess, and easy to enter into the system
- ▶ Better ways to make user choose stronger passwords?
- ▶ Better ways to use other devices for authentication
- ▶ Effective 2-factored and/or out of band authentication for the Web
- ▶ Phishing defense